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WI LLI AM A. FI NCH, ESQ. ,
Professor of the Law of Real Property, and
Secretary of the Faculty, of the School of
Law, of Cornell University,
This Treatise,
In partial recognition and appreciation of his
attainments as such Professor, of his great worth
as an Instructor in class, of the very high es-
teem in which he is held by all, and especially
of the deep sense of regard for him as a personal
friend, is gratefully inscribed by
T heAut hor.
The Law of
ESTATES UPON CONDITI ON.
Generally and ordinarily the law of real property i
extremely technical; however, in studying the subject under
consideration, it is to be observed that very frequently the
rules of reasonableness and intention prevail rather than
the niceties and rigid formulae of fixed laws. The pur-
pose of this treatise is, briefly to trace the develop-
ment historically of some of the principal rules of estates
upon condition and to point out the several interpretations
of their fixed laws and of the more pliable ones of reason-
ableness and intention, interpretations often widely differ-
ent and occasionally wholly irreconcilable. Nothing of an
original character is claimed or will be attempted in this
effort, save perhaps an occasional personal observation by
the writer upon some particular phase of the subject;any-
thing else would be presumptuous. Having extracted from
the various masters of the subject, both of the courts and
of the text-writers, some of the particular features and
characteristics of this highly interesting and eminently
practical branch of the law, and having to some extent sys-
tematically arranged the same, the writer will be pardoned
for any possible, and perhaps probable, shortcomings in
his efforts.
Freehold estates and those for years regularly
determine upon attaining their respective limits; however,
conditions may be imposed by force of which they may be
determined without attaining their regular limits of dura-
tion, and at the same time without losing their distinctive
character. Nor do these imposed conditions affect the
transrerability of such estates, for all conditional estates
are capable of being transferred in like manner as if es-
tates in fee simple absolute. Thus, in Grant v. Townsend,
2 Denio 336, the court say: "One seized of a determinable
fee ( e.g. an estate in fee subject to be defeated by the
happening of an event upon which an executory devise is
limited), may convey the estate and the grantee will take
it accompanied by the same determinable quality which be-
longed to it in the hands of his grantor." Washburn,(Vol.
I Ipage 6),says that the doctrine of estates upon condition
seems originally to have been derived from the feudal law,
and grew out of the conditions upon which fiefs were
granted. This statement is so frequently affirmed by all
the authorities that there can be no question as to its
accuracy.
But the condition may be connected with an estate
at will as well,(though to the contrary is Bingham, Real
Prop.,I., p. 270); and the breach of the condition duly
taken advantage of by the reversioner, on the occurrence
of the contingency, will determine the estate, as we shall
see later. Thus where tenants in common allowed the plain-
tiff to use their premises gratis, "so long as he kept a
good school," the plaintiff being deficient and the defend-
ants, the tenants in common, expelling him; the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts held: "this agreement gave the plain-
tife a tenancy at will with a conditional limitation, which
estate determines upon the happening of the contingency,to-
wit:-the ceasing or failure to keep a good school by the
plaintiff." Ashley v. Warner, et al., 11 Gray 43. So also
where P. leased to C. certain premises at a fixed rent pay-
every second month, until P. could sell the premises for
a stated sum, upon the happening of which event the tenancy
was to determine; six months later P. sold and conveyed the
premises to R. with C.'s knowledge. When R. demanded pos-
session, C. refused to surrender. In a suit to recover
possession, it was held: "The agreement to give up the pos-
session upon the sale of the premises, or to hold it until
a sale should be made, operated as a contingent limitation
of the term and when the contingency happened, the term
was at an end." Clark v. Rhodes, 79 Ind. 342. (Note:From
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the terms of the lease as given in the opinion, the writer
submits that the tenancy was one from year to year, rather
than at will ). Thus it will be observed that any estate
irrespcetive of its natural duration may be subjected to
a condition.
Where an estate is given upon condition, the tak-
ing possession of the land to which the condition is annexed
binds him to a performance of the condition even if at
a loss. So if an estate be made to an incapable person,
as to a married woman or an infant, and such person accepts)
he or she will be bound to perform the condition, because
it does not charge that one's person but the land.
Likewise a testamentary gift may be upon condi-
tion, to create which no particular form of words need be
used, for if a corresponding purpose be read into the will
that purpose takes effect. Schouler, Will, Sect.598.
The definition of an estate upon condition given
by Blackstone (4 Comm.152), is the one most commonly quoted,
and is probably the most accurate and comprehensive. He
says:-"Estafes upon condition are such as have aruqualifica-
tion annexed to them by which upon the happening or not hap-
pening of some uncertain event, the estate may either be
created or enlarged or defeated." Substantially the same
definition is given by all others who attempt to define
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the term. Thus in Larabee v. Carleton, 53 Me. 211, a con-
dition is defined as a "qualification or restriction annex-
ed to a conveyance and so united with it in the deed as to
qualify or restrain it." Obviously this is too narrow as
it excludes devises. "An estate on condition expressed in
the grant or devise itself is where the estate granted has
a qualification annexed whereby the estate shall commence,
be enlarged or defeated, upon the performance or breach of
such qualification or condition." Wheeler v. Walker,2 Conn,
196. Schouler says that any qualification, restriction or
limitation annexed to a gift, and modifying or destroyinf-
essentially its full enjoyment and disposal, may be deemed
a condition. Wigram, in his work on Wills,page 267, de-i
clares that a condition was a common law mode of defeating,
but not for transferring an estate. "A condition such as
can determine an estate is a provision of a punitive char-
acter secured to the reversioner for the purpose of enabl-
ing him to enforce a specific performance by the tenant of
his duty to his landlord." Bingham,Real Prop.,l,p.276.
Generally speaking, a condition may be made of
almonst anything that is not illegal or unreasonable, on
the principle that the owner of the land, who is not obliged
to transfer it at all, may impose on its transfer such con-
ditions or restrictions as he chooses and subject to which
the grantee takes the land, provided the conditions are not
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in contravention oP any determined policy of the law.
An exception in a deed of conveyance is not a
condition; but the land excepted must be used for the pur-
pose specified, else the party using it is a trespasser.
Dygert v. Matthews, 11 Wend. 36; Thompson v. Gregory, 4
Johns. 81.
Conditions may be variously divided into condi-
tions expressed or implied, precedent or subsequent, general
or special. Express conditions are those in deeds by actual
words; by implication of law they are conditions in law.
"Estates which men have upon condition in law are such es-
tates which have a condition by the law to them annexed al-
beit that it be not specified in writing; such conditions
as are intended by the law to be annexed to anything are
as strong as if the condition were put in writing. Condi-
tions in law may be made even if there be no mention of such
a condition upon the estate made. These latter are really
limitations usually' I Co. Litt. 222.
Express conditions are either general, putting
an absolute end to the tenancy on entry for breach; or spec-
ial, merely authorizing the reversioner to enter upon the
land and take the profits to his own use and hold the land
by way of pledge untill the condition be fulfilled. McCall,
Law of Real Prop., p. 100. It is a tacit condition, (i.e..
a condition implied in law), of a grant of incorporation
that the grantees shall act according to the end or design
for which they were incorporated, and not beyond it; thus,
an insurance company shall not carry on a general banking
business. Peo. v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 382.
Before taking up the considerations of conditions
precedent and subsequent, some attention will be given to a
brief discussion of the distinctions between conditions and
limitations, and conditions and conditional limitations. The
distinction in many cases is not always an obvious one; it
is however very necessary to distinguish them since their
several effects are essentially different. Thus in Finlay
v. King's Lesse, reported in 3 Pet. 246, the Supreme Court
of the United States say: "The obscure and ambiguous language
of a will renders it in many cases very perplexing to tell
whether the testator meant the one sort of condition or the
other, if indeed he clearly apprehended the distinction at
all; no criterion is afforded by the choice of technical
expressions, but the probable intention of the testator
must determine the construction in every case of this kind.
Limitations operate of necessity by their own-lin-
trinsic force, whether precedently to create an estate or
subsequently to defeat it; conditions strictly so-called
are the conditions of re-entry which render the estate de-
feasible by re-entry and do not necessarily defeatvit. The
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distinction in construction is said to lie in the terms
used; but it seems the distinction carrying with it so great
a difference in operation and effect, must depend upon the
intention and result rather than the exact letters of the
words.. As has just been seen, conditions annexed to estates
are sometimes so ambiguously drawn, especially when prepared
by unskilful hands, that it is difficult ofttimes to distin-
guish them. Perhaps the only general rule in determining
whether words are words of a condition or limitation, is
that where they circumscribe the continuance of the estate
and mark the period which is to determine it, they are words
of limitation; when they render the estate liable to be
defeated in case the event expressed should arise before the
determination of the estate, they are words of condition.
I Prest. Est. 129. In other wordsthe limitation marks the
period which is to determine the estate; but the words of
condition render the estate liable to be defeated in the
intermediate time if the event expressed in the condition
happens before the regular determination of the estate. The
one specifies the furthest time the estate may continue and
the other marks some event whose occurence defeats the es-
tate. The difference between a condition and a limitation
is mainly in this:- a condition does not defeat the estate
until by entry by the grantor or his heirs, when the grantor
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is in of his former estate; whereas the mere happening of
the circumstance upon which the limitation depends deter-
mines the estate, without the necessity of an entry or claim.
Miller v. Levy, 44 N. Y. 489. Oras is stated by Schouler,
sec. 607, "a devise or bequest is by way of limitation when
the estate or interest thereby is bounded or circumscribed
in time, so that it cannot last beyond the happening of a
stated contingency." So also a difference is to be noted
in their respective effects: if the breach of condition be
relieved against in chancery,or be excused by becoming im-
possible by the act of God, the estate to which it is an-
nexed remains unimpaired, if already vested, as will be
more fully shown hereafter; on the other hand, a limitation
determines an estate from whatever cause it arises: here the
estate is not technically defeated, but is really determined.
Practically the same difficulty arises in distin-
guishing between a simple condition and a conditional limi-
tation; the latter is of a mixed nature, partaking of the
characteristics of a condition and of a limitation; here
the condition is followed by a limitation over to a third
person in the event the condition remains unfulfilled or
there is a breach thereof: or as is much better and more co-
gently defined by our learned instructor in his class lec-
tures: "a conditional limitation is an estate draftia as
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upon condition with a remainder over, but construed as upon
limitation and giving the remainderman the estate upon the
termination of the preceding particular estate, instead of
requiring the original landlord or his heirs to enter and
t ien turn the estate over to the remainderman as would have
to be done if the condition were construed as a condition."
A conditional limitation is so far a limitation and is to
be distinguished from a conditionlthat upon the contingency
taking place, the estate passes to a stranger without entry,
contrary to the ordinary principle of law, tnat a stranger
cannot take advantage of a condition broken. 2 Kent, Comm.127
So that we may say a conditional limitation operates to de-
termine the estate by the intrinsic force of the limitation,
for the event prescribed by the terms of the condition ends
the estate; on the other hand, a condition alone operates
by reserving a right of entry, or rather of re-entry, (or
in some cases it may be some other mode of defeating the es-
tate), to the grantor and his heirs; here in the event pre-
scribed the estate becomes defeasible by entry, but until
entrr 'ie estate continues. An estate upon condition is
not void but voidable only by entry,or byclaim,uron the con-
dition; and unless the right off avoidance is ex~rcised the
estate continues. "A conditional limitation determining an
estate, leaves in the case of particular esta es tne next
vested remainder or reversion to take effect in imnediate
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possession. A condition annexed to an estate with a condi-
tional limitation woull be void and superfluous as regards
that estate; and a remainder which is contingent at the
time a conditional limitation takes effect, fails altogether."
LeakeLaw of Real Prop. Sometimes where the estate is in
terms an estate upon condition, it is construed into a con-
ditional limitation where it is necessary to carry out the
purposes and intent of the grant.
We revert now to the consideration of precedent
conditions and subsequent conditions,so-called. "The dis-
tinction between these two classes of conditions is well
enough understood by the profession; and still it is not al-
ways easy,in practice, to determine with certainty whether
a condition was intended to limit the acquisition or the
retention of the estate." II Redf.,Wills,p.283. Gener-
ally speaking it is according to their effect in giving rise
to or determing an estate, that conditions are distinguished
as precedent or subsequent. A condition precedent may be
defined as one which must take place before the estate de-
pendent on it can vest or be enlarged; while conditions sub-
sequent are those which operate upon estates already created
and vested, or which do not prevent the vesting of the es-
tate, but may enlarge or defeat th"em after they have been
created. However, conditiona precedent giving rise to fu-
ll
ture estates, may operate indirectly as conditions subse-
quent relatively to the preceding, estate by defe:,ting it;
the same limitation may be capable of being construed with
both aspects and may then determine the preceding estate;/
even though it fail in effect to carry the estate over. Upon
the performance of a condition precedent, the grantee's ti-
tle is complete without any further action by the grantor.
In spite of the general rule that "the law favors
the vesting of estates, and a condition annexed to an estate
is consequently presumed to be a subsequent one when not
clearly meant to be precedent," in all cases where the con-
dition is in the nature of a consideration for the concession,
its performance will be regarded as intended to precede the
vesting of any right, and so a condition precedent. Con-
ditions precedent,,admit of no latitude; they must be strict-
ly, literally and punctually performed. And a court of equi-
ty will never vest an estate when by reason of a condition
precedent it will not vest in law: such a court cannot re-
lieve from the consequences of a condition precedent unper-
formed. Hence where the condition precedent consists of
several copulative terms; all must be performed before the es-
tate vests, and auch an estate can never vest where the con-
dition fails of performance for any cause. So also, con-
ditions subsequent when relied on to work a forfeiture, must
be created by express terms or clear implication and are
construed strictly. (See R. R. Co. v. Coburn, 91 Ind.557.)
In these latter, since they are in defeasance of interests
already vested, courts of law and of equity are strict in
requiring the very event to happen or the act to be done
with all its particulars which is to defeat the interest
previously vested.
Conditions precedent do not affect the limitation
of an estate in respect of quantity or duration; they relate
only to the time of the crmmencement of the estate. Condi-
tions precedent giving rise to future estates occur in con-
tingent remainders at common law, in limitations by way of
springing and shifting uses and in executory devises. Con-
ditions subsequent may be annexed to future estates, vested
or contingent, operating upon estates in remainder and de-
termining them even before'they vest in possession; and so
also on contingent estates before they vest in interest.
"An estate is presumed to vest on the testator' s death rath-
er than at a later date. Hence if no intention to defer
the period of vesting definitely appears, while a definite
date for performing th7 condition after the testator's death,
appears, or if there appears a vesting as usual though on
probation, a condition subsequent rather than precedent
may be inferred; but the preferable inference is that of a
condition precedent where the vesting appears deferred to
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some definite date after the will comes into operation, es-
pecially if by some prompt or decisive act, the condition
may be performed or its alternative solved." Schouler on
Wills, sect.,599.
We have already observed that if a condition pre-
cedent fails of performance for any cause, the dependent
estate does not vest; on the other hand, if the condition
subsequent becomes impossible of performance, the effect is
not to defeat the estate dependent upon it, but that con-
tinues having once vested, the same as if no condition had
been attached. This is univ-rsally laid down by the courts
and text-writers. Thus a devise to A. if she continued
unmarried, but if she married with the consent of certain
persons she could have the estate as if she remained unmar-
ried, was construed to be a life estate, subject to the con-
dit'ion subsequent determining the estate if she married in
the lifetime of the persons named, without their consent;
this condition being rendered impossible by the death of
those persons and the estate for life became absolute. This
is an early English case reported in 3 Madd. 256, and has been
uniformly followed. It is also a general rule that where
a testator, subsequent to the making of his will, himself
renders impossible a condition whereon a devise depends, the
devise will b- held to be absolute irrespective of the con-
dition.
It is a fundamental rule that all conditions which
are in their nature or object illegal, are void and inoper-
ative,,a rule to which there are no exceptions. The only
question involved is whether the condition imposed is really
illegal; if it is, it is altogether void. Conditions to
omit a positive duty, to aid or encourage crimes, forbidden
by statute or some rule of the common law, are void per se.
Where the illegality of a condition precedent does not con-
cern anything 'malum in se' but is merely against a rule or
the policy of law, the condition only is void; for the con-
dition not being lawful, it is held in the phrase of the
Civil Law 'pro non adjecta.' Thus conditions annexed to a
gift the tendency of which is to induce husband and wife to
live separate, or be divorced, are upon grounds of public
policy and morality void.
There is a species of illegal conditions termed
'repugnant,' so called from their inconsistency with the in-
terests of those upon whom estates are bestowed; e.g., from
the imposition of restraints incompatible with the enjoyment
of their respective estates in so large and ample a manner
as the la.w allows when dispositions are so made. An exam-
ple of this is where a condition is annexed to the gift of
an estate tail that the donee shall rot marry; here the con-
dition is void ror without marriage he cannot have an heir
to his body. This part. of the subject will be dealt with
further when treatirny of 'restraints upon alienrtion, 'later.
There a condition is possible at the time of mak-
ing it and afterwards becomes impossible of performance
either by act of God or of the law or of tfie grantor,(as in
examples given ante), or if the condition be impossible at
the time of making it, the estate of the grantee being once
vested, is not thereby divested but becomes absolute. Mc.
Lachlan v. McLachlen, 9 Paige 534. Where a literal perform-
ance of a condition subsequent becomes impossible by the
happening of some event subsequent to the vesting of the
estate, the condition must then be performed as near the
intent of the testator as is possible. But a condition is
not regarded as impossible simply because it is beyond the
power of the grantee or devisee to perform it; it is only
so when it becomes impossible of performance. If' a condi-
tion is so expressed that it is impossible to ascertain
with certainty the event or contingency upon which the es-
tate is to arise or be defeated, it is equivalent to being
impossible and is equally inoperative. Under this head
of impossible conditions may be enumerated these:- where the
testator through ignorance has required acts to be done
that have already been performed., or events to happen which
have taken place; in such cases as the conditions are impos-
sible, thie beneficiaries under a will take their interests
pure an unqualified by such conditions. See Roper, Law of
Legacies, pp. 754-757.
So that it mr-y be said that the same rules apply
whether the condition be illegal or impossible at the time
of limiting the estate, or whether it becomes so afterwards;
and if the condition precedent be illegal or impossible,
both the condition and tne estate are void; if such condi-
tion be subsequent, whether as a conditional limitation or
as a condition of re)entry, the condition alone is void and
the estate good and absolute.
With reference to no other phase of our subject
do the authorities seem so hopelessly at variance as in their
views towards conditions in restraint of marriage. This
irreconcilable diversity has long existedand has now resolved
itself practically into the several branches of:-l,total and
partial restraints; 2, restraints against the remarriage of
widows; and 3, restraints of marriage unless with the consent
of specified persons. There are of course minor discus-
sions, hinging mainly upon the reasonableness of conditions
in partial restraint of marriage but the divisions given
above are the more important ones, and these will be treated
in the order named.
1. Where a gift was made to a woman for life with
a gift over if she marriei, it was held that the condition
operating in restraint of marriage was illegal and a gift
over was void and consequently the prior gift remained ab-
solute notwithstanding marriage; for in such case there is
nothing to give an interest beyond the marriage;(citing 2
Hare,570). Leake on Real Prop.,p.-- In Williams v. Cowden,
13 Mo. 211, we find that a general condition in restraint
of marriage is not good when attached to the estate of a
daughter . There the court says:-"Upon the general propo-
sition, the preservation of domestic happiness, the security
of private virtue and the rearing of families in habits of
sound morality and filial obedience and reverence, are to
be deemed objects too important to society to be weighed in
the scale against individual or personal will. In this case
it need scarcely be more specifically intimated, that the
clause in question, however well intended, virtually pre-
sented and hell up a continued reward for that species of
immorality to avert which the institution of marriage was
so divinely ordained and has been so wisely upheld." These
instances serve to illustrate the rule now generally observ-
ed that under ordinary circumstances a condition in general
restraint of marriage whether in a grant od devise will be
wholly void.
But a partial restraint upon marriage is not void,
supposing of course all such conditions are bona fide, that
compliance or non-compliance therewith is, from the nature
of things, practicable and that nothing irrational, no covert
restraint or prohibition, no violation of policy in other
respects, is involved in a gift so qualified. To render a
condition in restraint of marriage void, it must be in fact
general, or at least unreasonable and a condition that a
person shall not marry before attaining a certain age, pro-
vided the age fixed be not unreasonable, is a good condition.
It has been nowhere held or pretended, that an absolute pro-
hibition of marriage until twenty-one years of age is not
reasonable and lawful, anl must not be upheld as a good con-
dition, the violation of which may defeat a vested estate.
Shackelford v. Hall, 19 Ills. 212. It may be laid down as
a general rule that one w'io has an interest in the future
marriage and settlement of the person in life, may annex
any reasonable condition to the bequest of property to such
person even though it may operate to delao or restrict the
formation of the marriage relation. But where the restraint
though in form partial, renders marriage practically impos-
sible or very difficult, then the condition imposing it is
invalid. Maddox v. Maddox, 11 Gratt.804.
The greatest diversity of opinion prevails as to
a husband's imposing a complete restriction on his widow's
remarriage. On the one hand upholding the doctrine that
a husband may impose such restrictions, is Scholuer, who
makes the broad and unqualified assertion that a condition
that a widow shall not remarry is universally upheld as
valid. It is true he does not cite many American autiori-
ties in support of his assertion. However such a restric-
tion has been held valid in some jurisdictions, notably
Pennsylvania and Illinois.
It seems to be settled that devises of real estate
upon condition in restraint of marriage are valid in Penn-
sylvania. "If authority can settle anything in this state,
it must be taken as the settled law of the state that in a
devise of realty coupled with a condition in restraint if
future marriage, effect will be given to the condition by
making the breach of it work a forfeiture, whether thereis
a limitation over to another in that event or not." Cornell
v. Lovell, 35 Pa. St. 105.
So in Illinois we find the doctrine enunciated that
"a testator may impose reasonable and prudent restraints
upon the marriage of the objects of his bounty, by means of
conditions precedent or subsequent, or by limitations; while
he may not, with one single exception, impose perpetual cel-
ibacy upon the objects of his bounty, by means oc conditions
or limitations; that exception is in the case of a husband
in making bequests or legacies to his own wife; he may right-
fully impose the condition of forfeiture upnn her subsequent
marriage. The reason of this exception is the regard to
the family of the testator, rathe'- than any miorbid sensi-
bility or jealousy toward one who might come after him."
Shackelford v. Hall, supra.
"There seem no impropriety however in allowing the
operation of conditions in restraint of the marriage of
widows in favor of such persons as may have a reasonable
interest, pecuniary or moral, in the question of their mar-
riage." Redf,,Wills,I1,p.298.
To the same effect we find in Sharswood & Wait's
American Real Property,page 129:-"Pt now seems well settled
that a condition in restraint of a second marriage contain-
ed in a devise by the husband of the devisee will be upheld
and this in spite of the position taken by some judges and
eloquently urged by counsel that the policy of the law is
opposed to any restriction upon the legitimate increase of
population, and that restraints upon second marriage are
odious to the common law and to public policy as being the
invention of ecclesiastics to whom such marriages were dis-
tasteful."
In an earlier Pennsylvania case, that oP the Com-
monwealth v. Staufferl0 Pa. St. 350, ChiefJustice Gibson,
overruling the opinion of the court below, said, rather fa-
cetiously:- "I know of no policy on which such a point could
be rested, except the policy which for the sake of a divi-
sion of labor would make one man maintain the children be-
gotten by another. It would be extremely difficult to say
why a husband should not be at liberty to leave a homestead
to his wife without being compelled to let her share it with
a successor to his bed, and to use it as a nest to hatch a
brood of strangers to his blood."
There is considerable authority and reason, however,
on the other side of the question;i.e.,that such restraints
are invalid. Thus in the early case of Middleton v.Rice,
reported in 6 Pa.Law Jour.231, it is said;1"The idea that
a condition that a widow shall not marry is not unlawful
seems to have been taken from the civil law, or rather from
the canon law, which made conditions against marriage void,
as to virgins but allowed them as to widows, especially if
imposed by a husband on his own wife. Such a distinction
may have existed at Rome and have proceeded from a selfish
pride or ungenerous prejudice on the part of husbands or
ecclesiastics who were most likely the lawgivers there. To
the credit of English lawgivers, it never entered into their
minds to make any distinction of this sort, for certainly
it does not appear to be sustained by any principle of na-
ture or sound policy., Why should a widow of twenty-two be
restrained from marrying any more than if she had never mar-
ried? The condition is void because it puts a restraint
on marriage which ought not to be discouraged."
The question is regulated in Indiana by legisla-
tive enactment; section 2567 of the Revised Statutes of that
State provides that "a devise or bequest to a wife, with a
condition in restraint of marriage, shall stand, but the
condition shall be void." But where a testator devises land
to his wife "so long as she shall remain my widow,"thw court
said its "conclusion necessarily is, that the words used in
the devise in this case were words of limitation merely,
and not of condition in restraint of marriage and that in
consequence the estate which the widow,(who never remarried)
took in the lands devised to her will not extend beyond the
expiration of her term of widowhood;" and consequently a pur-
chaser from her does not get a fee simple, but only an estate
during her widowhood.
Other than the authorities mentioned in support
of the doctrine favoring such restraints on the remarriage
of widows, we are unable to discover any recognized judicial
authority which upholds that doctrine. Reason is certainly
strongly in favor of the other view, as well as public pol-
icy. Otherwise the disposition to repose confidence in
one's widow after one's death will be thwarted, at least cer-
tainly not encouraged. Moreover the wife is frequently as
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much entitled to credit in the accumulation of the estate
as the husband, and she should be allowed to exercise this
righteous privilege of enjoying it after the husband's de-
cease. Ample provision relatively can easily be made for
such as are dependent on the bounty of the testator, without
imposing any such severe and unreasonable restrictions on
his widow. While it does not necessarily follow that the
subsequent life and conduct of a widow will be any the less
virtuous as a consequence of such a restriction, it most
assuredly is the better, more humane, more generous and more
natural, to leave her free from any such restrictions. We
much prefer the latter view, as being the more reasonable,
politic and enlightened.
3. The preliminary requirement of marriage with
consent at any time, bting neither a general nor a fraudu-
lent restraint upon marriage, as such conditions are not
void by the civil law, there appears to be no reason why
they should not be so by our law. "A condition generally
not to marry without consent, first obtained and that volun-
tarily, where ther is a gift over in the event bf the first
donee marrying without such consent, fas been held valid in
a very great number of cases." (See Jarman,Wills,40,note b).
Where the consent of more than one person is required, all
must concur and that of a majority will not be sufficient.
Where all or any of the persons whose consent is required
decease, this naturally renders it impossible to procure such
consent and is the same as if the condition had become im-
possible, with the result ,e have seen before. When the
consent of executors or trustees, or the major number of
them, is required to the marrying of donees, it must be ob-
tained before gr at the time of the marriages. So also the
confidence reposed in individuals by testators, whetner rela-
tives or strangers, to decide upon the propriety of the mar-
riages of their children, is a personal trust and must there-
fore be strictly pursued in the performance. Absolute con-
sent once given cannot be retracted upon any consideration
which does not affect the propriety of having granted such
consent in the first instance. The reason seems to be that
the parties are considered to have acted upon the license,
and it would be doing violence to their feelings, as well as
to the intention of the testator, to permit the consent to
be countermanded for any reason which did not prove the as-
sent ought not to have been given originally. Mere caprice
should not be allowed to alternate between giving and with
drawing consents. But a consent obtained by fraud or imposition
will not of course, be considered a compliance with the con-
dition imposed. Moreover consent to marriage may be given
conditionally and the vesting of the estate will depend upon
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the performancer:or non-performance of this condition upon a
condition. Consent to the marriage of a legatee or devisee
will be considered well given and t,e condition complied
with, if such beneficiary marry with the approbation of the
testator in his lifetime, though in words tcie testator
has only spoken of a marriage to take place after his death.
Ro also in a condition to marry with tae consent of some
specified person, or or an alternative condition, the per-
formance of either part vests the estate.
A mere wish that a devisee should not marry with-
out doing a particular thing, does not constitute or create
a condition. Thus the clause that 'my wife shall never
marry without securing the propertyfor the benefit of her
and her children, is my desire;' was held not to affect the
provision in favor of the wife 'for and during her natural
life, so as to reduce her interest upon her marriage. Ray-
field v. Gaines, 17 Gratt.l.
Tucker, in his Manual of Wills, page b2, says:
"There are few cases in this Commonwealth (Mass.) upon con-
ditions in estrainl of marriage. As a rule it is safer
not to make tne gift dependent upon an absolute condition
but to limit it over to another upon the marriage of the
first taker."" This good advice may well be followed in
all states in which this question as yet remains ansettled.
The question as to what conditions ;.ffecting mar-
riage are valid must depend upon the circumstances of each
particular case and will be very materially affectel by the
consideration how far the condition was one fairly applica-
ble to the relations of the parties and the peculiar views
and situation of the donor and the donee.
Further on this general aspect of these conditions
we find in Roper's Law of Legacies, volume Ipp. 758,et seq-:
"That a restraint upon marriage may be judicious and proper,
admits of no doubt, and its total rejection by the Oivil
Law as at first established appears to have been founded on
no general principle but upon the particular circumstances
of the Roman empire at that time. After the ('ivil War, the
depopulation occasioned by it led to the habits of celibacy.
In the reign of Augustus the Julian law not only offered en-
couragement to marriage but laid heavy penalties and impo-
sitions upon celibacy. The rule being thus established for
the encouragement of marriage it followed that no person
could impose restraints directly contrary to the law. Hence
it became a rule of construction that these restrictive:con-
ditions were void; a rule certainly inapplicable to a coun-
try where there is no law to restrain individuals from exer-
cising their own diseretion as to the time and circumstances
of the marriages which their children or the objects of their
bounty may contract.- - - The unreasonableness of the suppo-
sition that a testator did not mean what he expressed, com-
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bined witn ti-,e consideration that the law of this cointry
did not, in policy, restrain the imposition of judicious
restraints upon marriage, has at last amid conflicting opin-
ions fixed the law upon this subject agreeably to the correct
rule of the rnivil Law; and it is now settled that although a
general restriction against marriage is void, yet conditions
imposing particular restraints upon marriage in testamentary
dispositions of property are legal and bind."
"fenerally speaking all such conditions which are
unreasonable, either on account of the donor having no recog-
nized rights to interest himself in t~ie marriage of the donee,
or becaust he goes beyond the jikst limits of a right which
does exist to a certain extent, or, because he attempts to
exercise his control in an improper manner or to an improper
extent, are void. Beyond this, the determination of the
question rest in the mere'judgment of the court upon the cir-
cumstances of each particular case. If the condition or
limitation of the bequest over is made to depend upon the
marriage of the female devisee, in such form as to indicate
the leading purpose in the testator to discourage har mar-
riage, it will be held void as against public policy; but if
the estate is passed over to others upon the marriage of the
first devisee, apparently because such person will more need
the aid therefrom arising than the first devisee after mar
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riag, , or foo any other bona fide purpose, aside !'rom the
hindering or discoiraging of tv-e rar'iage of the first de-
visee, the condition will be held legral, and the estate pass
over upon the marriage of such devisee." Redf.,Will,II.,298 .
An estate for life may be limited to determine on
alienation, b.t conditions in restraint of alienation cannot
be annexed to an estate in fee; being repugnant to an insep-
arable incident o ' tle estate they are wholly void. "If a
feoffment be made upon this condition, that tie feoffee shall
not alien the land to any, this condition is void, because
when a man is enfeoffed of lands or tenaments, he hath power
to alien them to any person by the law. For if such a con-
dition should be good, then the condition should oust him of
all the power which the law gives him, which should be a-
gainst reason and therefore such a condition is voide. So
it is Of any conveyance whereby a fee simple doth pass. It
is absurd and repugnant to reason that he that hath no pos-
sibility to have tne land reve,-t to him, shall restrain his
feoffee in fee simple of all his power to alien, being .gainst
the height and puritie of a fee simple." I Co. Litt. 223. A
condition annexed to an estate purporting to dispose of it
in case of intestacy is repugnant to an absolute interest
and void; so also a condition thiat the tenant shall not take
the profits of thie land; or that the land shall be let for-
ever at a definite rent.
At the common law it was a condition in law annexed
to the estate of a tenant for lLfe or for years or any other
particular estate, that if he made a tortious alienation,(e.
g. conveyei a greater interest than was really his,) such
alienation worked a forfeiture of his estate and the rever-
sioner or remainderman might enter as for a breach of con-
dition; but conveyances have no longer any tortious opera-
tion an. the grantee in such case will take only to the ex-
tent of the tenant's actual interest, without giving the re-
versioner or remainderman any such right of re-entry.
A devise to three children on condition not to sell
or convey to any one except one of the devisees, vests an
estate in fee and the condition is void. Schemerhorn v. I4egus
1 Denio 448. But on the other hand a condition that no
sale of the property conveyed shall be made without first
giving the grantor and his heirs an opportunity to purchase
it has been sustained in Jackson v. Schutz,18 Johns. 174.
A restriction against aliening except to one or
more persons, or after the lapse of a certain number of years,
or the occurrence of a particular event, being provisions in
favod of particular persons, are in the nature of trusts in
favor of such persons and being capable of creation, beyond
all question, by the use of proper terms, the inclination of
the courts is to give them effect according to the evident
intention of the testator. However where a devise was made
in fee with a restriction against alienation in less than
twenty-five years from the death of the testator, the condi-
tion was held void as violating the rule against perpetui-
ties. Oxley v. Lane,35 14. Y. 347.
A general restraint of alienation includes as well
a disposition by act of law,e.g., by bankruptcy, as by the
specific act of the person prohibited. Roper, Legacies.
Though an estate for life may be limited to determine upon
charging or attempting to charge the estate, or upon the
grantee's bankruptcy or insolvency. LeakeLaw of Real Prop.
Conditions in partial restraint of alienation are not favored
in law but are construed strictly in favor of the lessee and
are therefore hald applicable only to the first lessee and
not to his assignees.
The following limitations or conditions on fees
have been held valid in T ew York: on condition that the gran-
tee shall not at any time manufacture or sell intoxicating
liquors,etc., on the premises,Plumd v. Tubbs,41 N.Y.442; in
this opinion it is said:-"These views,(i.e. enhancing the
value of his property, bringing thither a more refined so-
ciety,&c.- of the grantor cannot be pronounced unreasonable
and absurd; the grantor had The right to hold them and he
had a right to use his property in a manner that would accom-
plish them;" on condition treat the grantee should support
the grantors,Spalding v. Hallenback,35 id.204; on condition
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that the grantee is not to build on the land under penalty
of forfeiture,Gibert v. Peteler,38 id.165; a grant or dedi-
cation to a public corporation of land on condition that it
be applied to, and used as, a publi square, Mayor v. Stuy-
vesant,17 id.34; a devise to a person until Gloversville
shall be incorporated as a village, Leonard v.Burr,18 id.96;
In the case of Plumb v. Tubbs,supra, the court approved those
cases wherein conditions against the use of the premises for
a schoolhouse, distillery, blast furnace, livery stable, ma-
chine shop, powder magazine, hospital, and cemetery, had
been upheld as valid. The condition in a grant to an organ-
zation or society that a church erected, or to be erected, by
it on the premises granted shall remain a free church, has
also been sustained. Woodworth v. Payne,74 N.Y. 196.
Various gifts are made conditional upon the mainte-
nance or education of others specified in a grant or will,
and such conditions are always upheld as legitimate and valid.
Leading cases of this sort will be found in Smith v. Jewett,
40 N.H. 530; Brigham v. Shattuck, 10 Pick. 306; Hogeboom v.
Hall,34 Wend. 146; Lindsey v. Lindsey,45 Ind.552; Calkins v.
Smith's Estate,- 41 Mich. 409.
Many other conditions, clear of meaning, are upheld
as violating no rule of policy; among them, a condition that
a person named shall be reared in a prescribed faith, Magee
v. Apperson,19 S.C.,170,(in this case the Catholic faith);
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on condition to defeat a pending lawsuit against the testa-
tor; Cannon v. O'Neill,14 Lea 553; that the parties benefited.
by the devise shall become and remain r~conciledto each other,
14 Bush 205.
In connection with the statement that a condition
providing for the support of the grantor will be valid ( ut
supra), it may be remarked. that it seems tnat such a condi-
tion partakes of a personal character and that the convey-
ance of the estate will not shift the obligation to the sub-
sequent grantee to perform the condition; it still remains
with the original grantee. Barker v. Cobb,3i ".H. 344.
We have seen that a will which purports to vest in
a devisee or legatee either real or personal property or the
income of such property and secure to him its enjoyment free
from liability for his debts, is void; and this on grounds
of public policy, not to add repugnancy, as being in fraud
of the rights of creditors; or in o'her words because it
takes away another of the incidents of property as essential
as the right to dispose of it. (qee 91 U.q.716). gowever a
gift of the income of property, real or personal, to cease
on the bankruptcy or insolvency of the devisee is good, being
a mere limitation. Oampbell v. Foster,35 V.Y.361.
Where a father revoked a provision in his will nn
condition that his daughter became a nun, it was held a valid
and legal condition, and that the provision ceased on her
becoming a nun although there was no bequest over.
All clauses or provisiond not to dispute one's
will under penalty of forfeiture should at least be constru-
ed as strictly as possible, being penal in their character
and operation. In some states the bona fide inquiry wheth-
er a will was procured through fraud or undue influence is
not to be stifled by any provision or prohibition contained
in the instrument itself. '2ckson v westerfield, 6l Tow.Pr
399 nut in otner states such conditions have recently
been pronounced valid, both as to real and personal property.
T'onegan v.Wade,70 Ala.501; 7radford v. Pradford, 19 Oh. t.546
An this score Redfield says'"in this country any condition
which is reasonable as one against disputing one's will
surely is since nothing can be more in conformity to good
policy than to prevent litigation, will be upheld as binding
and valid."(Taw of Wills,p .)
At comnon law an estate in fee simple mi~-it be
determin-d b:7 a conditional limitation so that upon the hap-
pening of - certain event the estate ceasedthus an estate
to A. and to the (male) heirs of his body , was a fee sim-
ple in quality; but as to quantity or duration it was deter-
minable by failure of (male) issue. Such limitations were
converted by the Statute De Donis into fees tail; but where
the statute did not apply such limitations, unless there
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were a special custom extant, were construel to give a fee
simple conditional. T\To such limitation cocld be made of
free-hold, lands after the Statute Quia Emptores, which pre-
vented the creation of any seignory to which an escheat of
the fee, upon the determination of the estate could attach;
so that now all fee simple estates are absolute in spite of
conditional limitations; and this on the theory that where
absolute property is once given to an individual, it cannot
be subjected during his life to a condition, that if he do
not use it or dispose of it, his interest shall cease and
go over to another. A right of entry upon positive con-
ditions expressed in a grant of fue may be reserved to the
grantor end his heirs, notwilhstanding the Otatute of Ouia
Fmptores, T. v. , 2 1. & Ald. 168.
An interesting series of cases was that involving
the alleged manor of Penssalaerwyck, a very large estate on
the Hudson. - rior to 1852, it was conceded that tne self-
styled lord of the manor was really a feudal one, and the
owner in reversion of whom those holding in fee were tenants;
hence the condition imposed,(in this case the payTment of cer-
tain rents), operated according to the coinmon law. Tut after
a long contest, the court finally decidedin TNePeyster vs.
" ichael,6 n'.Y. 467, that there was no reversion le.ft in the
owner in whose favor the condition of re-entry was reserved,
and that the so-called tknant in fee held absolutely. This
doctrine was endorsed in l'anRenssalaer v. Ways, 19 Y 95,
and has ever since been heldi to be the correct one. It
seems that all the states have adopted this rule, with pos-
sibly the exception of Pennsfrlvania
"Out of tavor to the devisee of lands, taere are
many cases, especially the older ones, insisting very strong-
ly upon the controlling force of technical words importing
a fee, so as to discard peremptorily whatever words of qual-
ification may follow, on the theory tnat a repugnant condi-
tion is attempted, which in consequence must be utterly void.
onceding that a restraint upon alienation is per se repug-
nant to an estate in fee or absolute gift of any kind, it
does not follow that such a condition must always be reject-
ed or repugnant; for tae context may show that this restric-
tion or qualification was of the very essence of the devise
or bequest, and that no fee, nor absolute gift, was contem-
plated at all, but a qualified gift, obnoxious in no respect
to the law or public policy." 'chouler,wills,sect.6 1
"If the conditions are subsequent, a failure to
perform the conditions may be followud by a Porfeiture of
the estate of (the grantee), even if it be a fee simple." 91
Ind. 557, R.R.no. v. Coburn.
It is a general principle of construction that con-
ditions are not favored, i.e., that limitations of estates
in terms importing conditions are to be construed, generally
in favor of vested and ondefeasible estates. The rule is
that conditions annextid to an estate are to be construed as
subsequent rather than precedent; as the immediate freehold
could not at common law be limited on a contingency, this is
perhaps the reason why the courts incline to construe con-
ditions as subsequent rather than precedent. However condi-
tions subsequent are not favored in law because they tend to
destroy estates and are therefore construed strictly, and
beneficially so as to save if possible the vested estate or
interest. nonrad v. Long,33 "ich. 78; Parker v. Parker,
123 "ass. 584; "rane v. Hyde, 135 -'ass. 149.
The pendency of ttie conditions depends on the order
of time in which the intent of the transaction requires per-
formance. As to the forms of conditions it is clear they
cannot depend upon the particular phraseology, but entirely
upon the general intent as expressed in the grant or will.
In all cases where the intention can be collected thlat the
devise should be conditional and the terms are so definite
as to admit of execution, such intent being legal will be
effectuated by whatever words expressed. But a condition
will not be readily raised or enlarged by construction. In
Jennings v. O'Brien, 47 Iowa 392, a father made a conveyance
to his son on condition that the son should not alien during
the father's lifetime; it was held that there was no condi-
tion to support the father during life.
If a covenant be followed by a clause of forfeit-
ure and it is broken, it will be construed as a condition;
'oore v. Pitts, 53 "T.Y. 85. So where a will imports a pres-
ent interest in the, devisee it is to be construed so that
any condition in the same shall be held subsequent and not
precedent. Bell v. Alexander,22 Tex. 350
A condition precedent, impossible eitlier in its
creation or under the existing circumstances, or illegal,
carries down with it the devise whose vesting depended upon
it, and this even though- the devisee himself be without
blame; strict construction here avails but little if it can-
not declare that the will really imposed no distinct condi-
tion precedent at all.
"Still carrying out the general desire of the law
to declare remainders vested, words of seeming condition will
if possible be hell to have the effect of postponing the time
of possession merely and if clearly conditional will be inter-
preted, so far as the context will permit, as conditions sub-
sequent and not as precedent so as to confer a vested remain-
der, subject to a divestitu-e on the contingency of non-com-
pliance with the condition." Linton v. Laycock, 33 Oh. st.,
128.
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A Freehold estate coririencing at common law by liv-
ery of seisin, cannot be divested under a condition without
a resumption of the seisin by entry; hence the condition,
though expressly worded that upon a certain act or event
shall cease or be void, imports only that a right of entry
is given to avoid it; the estate does not become 'ipse facto'
void under thie condition, but voidable only by entry- Ut
when there can be no entry or possession, tnere being no
livery, the one who may take advantage of tne condition,
must make a claim upon the land before the estate can be re-
vested. However a condition annexed to a lease for years
does not require an entry or claim unless so stipulated. A
condition avoids the estate to which it is annexed and re-
vests the original estate of the grantor or lessor so far as
circLlrstances permit it. A condition like a conditional
limitation, must in general defeat or determine tne whole
estate to which it is annexed; it cannot avoid t;ie estate in
part only and continue it in part.
Express conditions to be performed by the grantor
or lessor precedent to his right to re-enter may supersede
the implied conditions of the common law and must be duly
complied with.
A tender of performance on the day and at the place
will save a condition and if it is refused, trie land may be
discharged from the lien as in the tender of payment of a
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mortgage, though the debt may remain as a personal claim.
Kortright v. Oady, 21 '.Y. 343.
The time prescribed by the testator may be so in-
dispensable to the due performance of the condition, that
its non-observance-will be fatal to the legatee's title. To
forfeit the estate granted for breach of condition, the
breach must be taken advantage of by some positive act on
the part of the person entitled to the condition; and herein
consists the great distinction between a condition and a con-
ditional limitation:- in the latter case the estate being
determined on the arrival of the period of limitation with-
out any act, entry or claim.
"A condition, however, defeats the estate to which
it is annexed only at the election of him who has a right to
enforce it. 17otwithstanding its breach, the estate (of a
freehold), can only be defeated by an entry made and until
that is done, it loses none of its original qualities or in-
cidents." Washb. R. P., I., 450
Non-performance of a condition will be excused by
the default of the person to whom it is to be performed:-
when he is absent at the time his presence in necessary;
where he himself obstructs or prevents performance; or when
he neglects to do a required first part of the condition.
It is not necessary in order to advantage being
taken of a breach of condition, that it should have caused
any injury to the party whio enters for that breach. Thr
right which a conditional grantor of an estate has to regain
the estate upon the breach of the condition is a present
vested interest in the nature of a reversion which he may
at any time convey to his .,rantee upon condition, by release
or he may devise ii. and it is transmissible to his heirs.
"One who (as heir), has an estate or title real
independently of the deed or instrument containing a condi-
tion of forfeiture, shall not be presumed to have notice of
the condition and he shall not be held to have incurred the
forfeiture unless he committed t-qe breach with the knowledge
of the condition and its consequences." Shackelford v. Hall,
19 Ills. 212.
Where a tenant at will under a verbal lease depend-
ent upon a condition, holls over after a breach t'ereof, he
is a tenant at sufferance. Oreech v. ( rockett,5 Oush. 133.
Where there is no ground for the interference of a
court of equity to relieve against a condition, and an estate
is limited defeasible on a breach of tae condition, a recov-
ery will be decreed. When a grantor is entitled to a rever-
sion of the estate for a condition broken, his right is not
affected by the fact that tuie grantee has made outlays; his
right is a legal one. 73 Maine 408.
In ancient tlmes t~ie bel efit of the condition of
re-entry in a lease could belong only to tue landlord and
his heirs; for the law would not allow of trie transfer of a
mere conditional rigtit to put an end to tne estate of anotter.
Even here the landlord acquires no new right of property,
but merely takes possession of the land under his antecedent
right of' property. This is a remnant of the feudal law,
which gave to the condition all the force and effect it had,
to enforce of the vassal strict performance of tne stipula-
ted services to the lord. Further, the condition must have
been attached at the time of making the lease and not subse-
quently.
At common law, a condition can be reserved in a
conveyance, only to the grantor or lessor of the estate and
to his heirs and to no other persons. If a devise be made
by will upon condition, the heir of the testator would be
entitled to enter upon breach of the condition. A condi-
tion was not assignable at common law, but by a recent act
of Parliament,(S and 9 "ictoria,c.106,s.6), "a right of en-
try, vested or contingent, may be disposed of by deed." This
does not seem to be true in this country, -at least not in
'Tew York, for the right to take advantage of a condition
cannot be conveyed so as to give the assignee a right to en,-
force it, but the conveyance will be so far eefective that
it will destroy the right of the grantor to enforce it, thus
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Pt'actically destroying the condition. Underhill v. R.R.Co.,
20 Barb. 455; Ludlow v. R.R.Co., 12 id. 440; Still v. Trus-
tees,etc., 46 id. 109; Parsons v. Millei', 15 Wend. 561; Mich-
ols v. R.R.Co., 12 N.Y. 121; Towle v. Remsen, 70id. 603.
Tnt-it * carried to Ihe extent thiat usually all thre grantors
or their heirs, must join in the action to recover premises
conveyed upon a conition subsequent, after a breach of trie
condition. Cook v. Wardens,etc., 67 N.Y. 594. An entry by
a stranger on behalf of a person entitled to enter is good
without authority it' assented to afterwards by sttch person.
Likewise, a stranger may compel any enforcement of the con-
dition where he has purchased real estate on the faith that
the conditions will be performed. Thus the grantee of one
parcel of a tract of lani sold on certain conditions to sev-
eral and various persons, may tihrough a court of equity en-
force against the'grantee of another such parcel, tie observ-
ance of the conditions. Ives v. VanAuker, 34 Barb. 5(6.
"With respect to tne parties entitlet to exercise
t e right to enter and defeat tmie estate of him who holdIs
upon condition, there seems to be a difference between con-
ditions in law and in deed; if there be a breach of the con-
-ition in law, the lessor or his heirs, or if he mas aliened
-is estate, his assignee, ma,, avail himself of the right to
enter; but if the latter, no one but him who creates the
estate, or his heirs, can take advantage by entering and de-
s t roying the estate." II. Washb. Real Pro.. 1l. So upon the
princilles of strict construction given above a condition of
re-entry reserved to a grantor or lessor, without ary express
extensiont to heirs, executors,&c., is restricted to tfie per-
son of the -rantor or lessor, and thie huir or executor can-
not take advantage of it, To the contra-ry however is Fonda
v. Sage, 46 Barb. 109, supraf where it is said that the heir
need not be expressly named in the instrument creating the
condition to entitle him to take advantage of a breach tnere-
of, occurring either in the lifetime of the grantor or after
his death. Continuing, tne opinion of the court says that,
to have any effect on the estate, the condition must be. taken
advantage of by those to whom the right so to do belongs;
and it may be stated as a general rule that with the breach
of a condition a stranger has nothing to do, and a court
will not examine at his request, or in a collateral proceed-
ing, the question whetner a condition has been broken and a
forfeiture incurred.
The statement is often made that when the will
specifies no particular lime for pei'formance, the donee shall
have his whole lifetime. Schouleron Wills, sect. 600., says
this "is too broad and means no more, properly understood,
than to pledge a court of equity to favor one against thie
harsh operation of conditions, especially of conditions pre-
cedent, as generously as the circumstances and a due inter-
pretation of the will may permit, where the testator has left
the point open."
Where an estate is given eor a certain period,
with a condition that unless the lessee do a certain thing
or pay a certain sum within a time ste, the estate shall be
reduced.-- then if the lessee fails to do that certain thing
or pay that certain sum within the time designated, thte law
will vest in the lessee only the lesser estate. (Co. Litt,
218, b.) On the same principle, a legacy on condition of
being claimed by the legatee in a certain time and manner
is forfeited if the legatee die without performing the con-
d~tion, or even when the legatee was ignorant of the bequest
and of the decease of the testator. It is too late for
the heirs of a testator devising land upon condition with
a devise over upon a breach of such condition, to take ad-
vantage of the breach by making an entry after tae estate
had passed by the limitation into the hands of the remain-
der-man. Williams v. Angell,7 R.I. 145.
In New York the necessity for a demand of posses-
sion upon condition has been abrogated by statute and the
bring of an ejectment is sufficient demand. Hosford v.
Ballard, 39 N.Y. 147; Cruger v. McLaury, 41 N.Y. 219.
Wher a person enters for a condition broken, the
estate becomes void ab initio and the person who enters be-
comes again seized of his original estate and is in the same
situation as if he had never conveyed it away; and the entry
of the feoffor for condition broken defeats the estate to
which the condition was annexed, so it defeats all the rights
and incidents annexed to that estate and all charges and in-
cumbrances created by the feoffer during his possession.
This perhaps seems somewhat harsh, but it could not very well
be otherwise, without disturbing the whole arrangement and
operation of such estates.
The forfeiture under a condition is waived and
dispensed with if the grantor or lessor, after having knowl-
edge of the grounds of forfeiture, does any act unequivo-
cally affirming the continuance of the estate or tenancy; s
such acts of waiver of forfeiture operates as an election
not to avoid the estate which, when once made and duly ex-
pressed, cannot be restricted. But they operate only retro-
spectively, and if the condition be a contingent one, a sub-
sequent breach will again create a right of re-entry. So
also where the election is duly made by entry or otherwise
to avoid the estate, or where it becomes 'ipse facto' void
under the condition or limitation, no act of waiver can oper-
ate afterwards to revive or continue it.
The forfeiture may be waived when the condition
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has been broken, if the party who has the right to avail him-
self of the same waives the right which he may do by acts
as well as by an express agreement. If the forfeiture is
once waived it cannot afterwards be reclaimed. Cornwell v.
I sham, 1 Conn. 79.
But a mere silent acquiescence in or parol assent
to, an act which has constituted a breach of an express con-
dition in a deed, would not amount to a waiver of a right
of forfeiture for such breach. Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick.284.
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